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What is Legal Doctrine
Emerson Tiller and Frank B. Cross

Abstract

Legal doctrine is the currency of the law. In many respects, doctrine is the law, at
least as it comes from courts. Judicial opinions create the rules or standards that
comprise legal doctrine. Yet the nature and effect of legal doctrine has been woefully understudied. Researchers from the legal academy and from political science
departments have conducted extensive research on the law, but they have largely
ignored the others’ efforts. Part of the reason for this unfortunate disconnect is
that neither has effectively come to grips with the descriptive meaning of legal
doctrine. In this article, we attempt to describe the concept of legal doctrine and
propound various theories of how legal doctrine may matter in judicial decision
making and how those theories may be empirically tested.

What Is Legal Doctrine?
Emerson H. Tiller*
Frank B. Cross**

Legal doctrine is the currency of the law. In many respects, doctrine, or precedent, is the
law, at least as it comes from courts. Judicial opinions create the rules or standards that
comprise legal doctrine. Yet the nature and effect of legal doctrine has been woefully
understudied. Researchers from the legal academy and from political science
departments have conducted extensive research on the law, but they have largely ignored
the others’ efforts.1 Unfortunately, neither has effectively come to grips with the
descriptive meaning of legal doctrine. In this article, we propound various theories of
how legal doctrine may matter and how those theories may be tested.
Legal doctrine sets the terms for future resolution of cases in an area. Doctrine
may take many forms, it may be fact dependent, and therefore limited, or sweeping in its
breadth. One doctrinal distinction commonly discussed in the law is the distinction
between “rules” and “standards.”2 Rules are strict requirements that define the answer to
a dispute, once the predicate facts are established. A rule is something like “any
subsequent and unauthorized use of another’s mark constitutes trademark infringement.”.
Standards, by contrast, are more amorphous guides to resolving disputes, often listing a
set of factors to be considered and balanced. A standard would be a law that directed
“trademark infringement occurs when there is a likelihood of confusion between the
senior and junior marks, as determined by weighing the following factors …”.. Both
doctrinal approaches are found in the law, but there is little analysis of why one might
prefer a rule or a standard and what the subsequent effects of the two types of doctrine
might be.3 It is frequently presumed that standards leave space for more ideological
judging, but this claim has never been demonstrated
Legal researchers have extensively dealt with doctrine as a normative matter, but
have given little attention to the manner in which it actually functions. Social scientists,
who have done important descriptive work about how courts actually function, have
largely ignored the significance of legal doctrine. Consequently, we are left with a very
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poor understanding of the most central question about the law’s functioning in society.
Fortunately, recent years have seen the beginnings of rigorous research into this question.
As legal researchers increasingly conduct quantitative empirical research and collaborate
with social scientists, we may hope for an efflorescence of this research and a greatly
enhanced understanding of legal doctrine. The necessary information requires the
scientific study of legal doctrine. This article sketches a theoretical outline of how that
research might proceed.

I.

Traditional Legal Views of Doctrine

The conventional legal approach to the law is all about doctrine. Legal academics
understand that the language of judicial opinions represents the law. The classical form
of legal scholarship was doctrinal analysis, in which a researcher examined the content of
a legal opinion and evaluated whether it was effectively reasoned or explored its
implications for future cases.4 Doctrinal analysis was grounded in a descriptive premise
that reasoned argument from doctrinal premises actually explained judicial decisions.
This research was often evaluative and critical but implied only that courts had erred,
such that a persuasive doctrinal analysis could show the judiciary the error of its ways
and provoke a new course of legal reasoning.
Legal academics, unsurprisingly, have focused on the traditional legal model of
judicial decision making based on “reasoned response to reasoned argument.”5 Through
this process, one obtains “legal reasoning that can generate outcomes in controversial
disputes independent of the political or economic ideology of the judge.”6 Central to this
legal model is the basing of decisions on some neutral legal principles, free from any
political or personal contamination. By its very nature, the identity of the judge should
not determine the judicial outcome, if the law rules. In this legal model of judicial
decision making, a judge identifies the facts of the case, identifies the legal rules that best
govern those facts, and then applies those legal rules to the facts, with simple logic
dictating the judge’s decision.
The legal realists attacked this conventional wisdom in the first half of the 20th
Century. They claimed that the traditional materials of the law, such as doctrine, did not
determine judicial decisions.7 For the realists, legal language was too indeterminate to
answer judicial disputes, and judges had no self interest in relying on the law in
decisions, as opposed to their personal preferences. The realists maintained that judges
first identified their desired resolution of a case, perhaps due to personal ideological
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preferences, and then manipulated the available legal materials to support that
conclusion.8 In this vision, legal doctrine was mere window dressing.
Although subsequent legal research never fully came to grips with and refuted the
descriptive claims of the legal realists, the theory’s influence waned in the face of the
“legal process” school. In this perspective, “the study of law became the study of a
procedure by which judges, rather than simply apply doctrine in a mechanical fashion,
use doctrine in the process of reasoning towards a decision.”9 The theory was sometimes
associated with the use of “neutral principles,” and it gave considerable attention to legal
procedures, in addition to substantive rules.
Fundamentally, if implicitly, the legal process school did challenge the premises
of legal realism, in its emphasis on the importance of procedure. There is no particular
reason why an ideological judiciary would create such elaborate rules of procedure, and
use them in decisions, rather than manipulating the substantive law to reach their
preferred decisions. Consider the procedural rule requiring appellate courts to give
deference to the factual findings of trial courts. This rule is orthogonal to ideology, as the
lower court decision may be ideologically agreeable or disagreeable. Yet the rule of
deference not only exists, it is widely adhered to. This legal rule is amenable to legal
testing, as one can quantitatively code for reversals or affirmances. When such a study
was conducted, it found that this procedural deference was a more significant determinant
of circuit court outcomes than was judicial ideology.10 Moreover, when doctrine
commanded a higher or lower level of deference to the ruling below, the circuit court’s
probability of reversal corresponded with the level of deference it was to give.11 The
legal process theorists did not conduct such empirical analyses, of course, but their theory
on this doctrine was falsifiable, and when confirmed on empirical testing undermined the
more extreme claims of legal realism.
The legal process analysis was narrowly legal, though, and didn’t consider the
societal implications of doctrine. For example, a judge might reach the same result on a
substantive or procedural basis and accordingly set a substantive or procedural precedent.
The open question is why a judge would choose one path over the other and what the
implications of that choice are for future decisions. A naïve legalist would assume that
this choice was driven by the dictates of the law and only the law, but this assumption is
unproved and in fact contradicted by considerable evidence that is discussed in the
following section.

8

The more recent critical legal studies movement is the heir to this skepticism about the
significance of law and doctrine. See id. at 421-509.
9

NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 210 (1995).

10

See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV.
1457, 1509 (2003).
11

See id. at 1501 (observing that trial judgments were reversed at a lower rate than were summary
judgment rulings, which in turn were reversed at a rate lower than j.n.o.v. appeals) and 1503 (finding that
the rate of reversals of administrative agency decisions corresponded to the degree of deference those
agency decisions were due under prevailing doctrine).

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

Many legal researchers now recognize that judicial ideology influences judicial
decisions. Some have conducted empirical research that shows this effect.12 This
research has assumed some public policy significance as it has been cited by a member of
Congress in a judicial confirmation debate.13 The empirical analyses of ideology,
including those performed by social scientists (as discussed below) has increasingly
entered legal research. This recognition of ideology by legal researchers, though, does
not involve a dismissal of the role of doctrine in decision making, though it unfortunately
has caused the significance of legal doctrine to be overlooked.
Legal researchers have not entirely ignored the broader functioning of doctrine,
and a few particular doctrines have even seen serious analysis. Perhaps the best example
would be the law of standing and the doctrines relating to it. Richard Pierce has argued
and presented some evidence that standing doctrines are entirely ideological, such that “a
liberal judge would give standing to environmentalists, employees, and prisoners, but not
to banks, while a conservative judge would give standing to banks, but not to
environmentalists, employees or prisoners.”14 A more recent study concluded that that
“judges render law-abiding and predictable decisions where clear precedent and effective
judicial oversight exist; where these variables are absent, however, standing decisions are
more likely to be based on judges' personal ideologies.”15 The most likely explanation
for standing rules is a doctrinal attempt to influence the ideology of future lower court
decisions. By adding a hurdle that plaintiffs must surmount, the doctrine makes it more
difficult to sue the government, and easier for ideological judges to reject such lawsuits.
If one assumes that access to court generally advances legal ends, one would expect
judicial conservatives to press for a stricter standing doctrine, as they in fact have.16
Legal research has also begun to take the first steps toward a broader analysis of
the role of decision structures in judicial decision making. Pablo Spiller and Matthew
Spitzer, for example, have theorized that a judge might use a constitutional decision
instrument to resolve a case, rather than a statutory one, in order to insulate that decision
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from congressional override.17 This is the type of more sophisticated doctrinal analysis
that is needed, but it suffers from a certain naiveté about the law, as judges do not
commonly have available such a choice between constitutional and statutory theories.
Most statutory interpretation cases do not present constitutional issues.
Emerson Tiller and Pablo Spiller theorized that lower court judges may employ
“instrument” choices – in their study, the choice between statutory interpretation and
reasoning process as decision modes to reverse agency policies -- to insulate their
decisions from higher court review when the lower court wishes to protect its decisions
from the chance of higher court reversal.18 Tiller and Joseph Smith examined circuit
court administrative law decisions and a strategic association in connection with a judge’s
choice of legal instruments (process or statutory) in administrative law cases.19 They
concluded that judges can use their choice among decision instruments to insulate their
case outcomes from reversal by an ideologically contrary higher court. Subsequent
research into the judicial application of sentencing guidelines reached similar findings
about the doctrinal choices of judges.20
Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller examined the role of doctrine on three judge
panels of the circuit courts and found that doctrine played a key role when (1) the panel
was made up of both democrat and republican appointees (rather than being unified in
political ideology), and (2) the political-minority judge had the doctrine supporting his
position.21 In such case, the panel majority followed doctrine rather than the panel
majority’s assumed political policy preference. By contrast, when the panel was
politically unified, doctrine was systematically ignored if it conflicted with the desired
policy outcome of the majority.
Frank Cross also has embarked on some empirical analysis of the actual effect of
legal doctrine. With Stefanie Lindquist, he has sought to measure if and when doctrine
controls the decisions of the courts.22 This study initially examined cases of first
impression, without doctrinal direction, and found that judges in such cases were in fact
more ideological than in cases governed by precedent. As precedent developed over
17
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time, however, it did not exercise an increased constraint on judges. Indeed, the
expansion of precedents appeared to have some effect of liberating judges to be more
ideological. Doctrine, it appears, may be either constraining or not. The next step must
be to study the specific content of doctrine.
Legal academics’ view of doctrine has evolved. For many, doctrine represents the
legal rules faithfully applied by judges. However, there has grown a recognition that the
law is not applied with perfect neutrality, but its application is influenced by external
concerns, such as judicial ideology. Rubin and Feeley have explored the creation of new
doctrine, which they argue is a product of both judicial ideology and the preexisting legal
principles on which the judges must build.23 The legal view increasingly recognizes that
the law is not everything but insists that it is still something important.

II.

Social Scientific Views of Doctrine

In stark contrast to legal research, many social scientists have disregarded the
significance of doctrine entirely.24 This disregard is borne of a presumption that the law,
as understood by legal academics, doesn’t really matter to judges. The quantitative social
scientific research has been carried out by political scientists who have generally
embraced an a priori position that judges are fundamentally ideological in their approach
to making decisions. In addition, social scientists insist that theories be falsifiable, which
causes a devaluation of the historic path of legal research. The best test for falsifiable
theories is statistical empirical analysis, which is commonly used among social scientific
studies of judicial behavior.
Quantitative analysis, which provides scientific rigor to studies of the law,
requires the reduction of law to numbers of some sort. The most readily available
numeric reduction involved case outcomes. The outcomes of cases could easily be coded
on a binary scale (as conservative or liberal, affirmance or reversal, etc.), and outcomes
analysis became the default tool for quantitative social scientific studies of judicial
decision making. Moreover, as the outcomes analyses proceeded, social scientists
obtained a reasoned basis for ignoring the content of opinions.
Political scientists who conducted studies of judicial outcomes found that they
had a statistically significant association with the apparent ideologies of the deciding
judges (sometimes called the “attitudinal model”). In 1993, Jeff Segal and Harold Spaeth
set out the case for this approach in the now famous The Supreme Court and the
Attitudinal Model,25 since updated.26 The book identified ideological positions for the
23
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justices of the Supreme Court and demonstrated that those ideologies frequently
correlated with the votes cast by those justices. Scores of additional studies have
confirmed this association. A meta-analysis of the available comparable research to date
found that ideology was a statistically significant determinant of decisions for every level
of courts, though the power of the ideological effect varied by type of case and quite
dramatically by type of court (e.g., the effect is much more powerful in the U.S. Supreme
Court than in lower federal courts).27
While these studies have consistently shown some role for judicial ideology, they
have measured only decisional outcomes, as in which party prevailed in the case and
whether it took a conservative or liberal position. The case outcome is obviously
important for the immediate parties to the action but carries no particular significance for
others. The language of the opinion at least purports to establish the rules to govern
future cases, but political science researchers have generally disregarded the significance
of this language. The general outlook was captured in a very early statement by Harold
Spaeth, who said: “I find the key to judicial behavior in what justices do, Professor
Mendelson in what they say. I focus upon their votes, he upon their opinions.”28
While one cannot dispute the practical significance of outcomes, a decision to
ignore opinions misses the law. Consider the Supreme Court’s ruling on abortion rights
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,29 in which the Court
declined to overrule its holding in Roe v. Wade, but modified its trimester analysis in
favor of an “undue burden” approach for analyzing the constitutionality of state
restrictions on abortion. The Court’s decision in Casey was grounded substantially in the
importance of adhering to precedent. The opinion in Casey substantially modified the
rule set forth in Roe and generally reduced constitutional rights to an abortion. Because
Casey upheld certain Pennsylvania limitations on abortions, it would be coded as having
a conservative outcome by political scientists doing quantitative analysis of decisions.
This coding is accurate inasmuch as the decision represented a shift from Roe in a
conservative direction. However, a decision overruling Roe would have been vastly more
significant, yet would have received the identical coding. The outcome of Casey was
certainly important, but doctrine it created for future application was far more significant.
As Chief Justice Vinson observed: “What the Court is interested in is the actual practical
effect of the disputed decision – its consequences for other litigants and in other
situations.”30 Merely coding for the outcome misses most of the importance of the
judicial decision.
26
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Once they concluded that case outcomes were indeed determined by judicial
ideology, political scientists could easily jump to the conclusion that the content of legal
opinions in fact did not matter. Judges of different ideologies would produce different
decisions, even when operating from the same legal doctrine. With this finding, political
scientists could dismiss doctrine as nothing more than a beard hiding the true basis for
judicial decisions. They argued that doctrine was substantively meaningless, because it
did not determine any future decisions. Their research became a disciplined case for the
claims of traditional legal realism.
The quantitative evidence about ideology and judicial decision making was far
too weak, however, to support this conclusion. While the studies often demonstrated a
statistically significant correlation between judicial ideology and judicial decisions,
ideology did not predict the vast majority of decisions. In fact, the effect at judicial levels
below the Supreme Court is quite modest.31 Not only was the effect of ideology limited,
the studies very rarely contained any doctrinal variable to control for the independent
effects of the law on ideology. Finally, the political science research focused
overwhelmingly on Supreme Court decisions, which are unrepresentative, involving only
a tiny fraction of the functioning law, and often on an even smaller subset of Supreme
Court cases involving controversial issues of civil liberties.32
As the social scientific study of law has progressed, it has begun to acknowledge
that the content of judicial opinions, legal doctrine, is worthy of examination. The
earliest prominent study came from attitudinalists, seeking to show that doctrine did not
in fact influence subsequent judicial decisions. Segal and Spaeth recently undertook a
study of the Supreme Court’s use of precedent. They started with a number of landmark
Supreme Court decisions that contained dissenting opinions and then identified the
“progeny” of those cases.33 They then examined the behavior of the justices who
dissented from the original ruling and found that those justices consistently continued
their initial dissenting position on the legal question, regardless of the precedent set by
the original opinion.34 The study is important for its empirical exploration of doctrine,
but its findings have been disputed,35 and it addressed only the Supreme Court’s
31
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application of its own horizontal precedent in the most controversial of cases.36 The true
power of Supreme Court doctrine lies in its ability to influence the vast mass of cases
decided at lower levels of the judiciary.
In contrast to the Segal and Spaeth findings, Mark Richards and Bert Kritzer
found that certain Supreme Court decisions established new “jurisprudential regimes”
that dictated the structure of subsequent decisions.37 The decisions had influence by
“establishing which case factors are relevant for decision making and/or by setting the
level of scrutiny or balancing the justices are to employ in assessing case factors.”38 This
approach came close to a true study of doctrine and found some effect even at the
Supreme Court level. The research did not address the questions of why the justices
crafted specific language or exactly how different language mattered, but it established
the very important point that doctrine does matter in future decisions.
As noted above, the primary power of doctrine lies in its ability to influence
decisions by lower courts. A number of political scientists have studied this particular
question and found that Supreme Court doctrine does appear to drive subsequent lower
court opinions. Lower court apparently faithfully followed Supreme Court decisions on
issues such as defamation and the first amendment,39 obscenity,40 and search and seizure
law.41 These findings are salient in their showing that the Supreme Court’s precedents do
in fact influence lower courts, but they shed little light on the intriguing details of why
particular doctrines are adopted and how different formulations of doctrine may have
different effects.
An important book by Lee Epstein and Jack Knight acknowledged that doctrine
did matter to Supreme Court justices and discussed how they might strategically use
precedents.42 Like other political scientists, they assume that justices’ goals are entirely
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ideological. However, they argue that adherence to doctrine is necessary to legitimize
judicial authority, so justices consequently do attend to doctrine. Thus, the justices will
“strategically modify their position” to take account of precedent and try to reach a
decision as close as possible to their preferred ideology, within the constraints of legal
requirements.43 While the books’ theory of judicial decision making is somewhat
limited, it does suggest that the content of doctrine is important to the path of the law and
that decisions are not utterly ideological.
A book by Thomas Hansford and James Spriggs takes a broader approach to the
study of Supreme Court doctrine.44 Their study tries to identify when doctrine is
affirmed and when it is limited and the degree to which that decision is affected by
justices’ ideologies or by the strength of the precedent being interpreted. This research is
an important breakthrough in the quantitative analysis of doctrine, but it suffers from
some of the limitations common to past political science research. It is Supreme Courtcentric, focuses on ideology, and ignores the actual content of opinions. Nevertheless, it
produces some significant findings, such as the discovery that ideological justices will go
after the strongest, best accepted, existing but ideologically contrary precedents and try to
limit their application in subsequent opinions. And the book is but the beginning of
empirical research into doctrine and its meaning.
Social scientists have indirectly theorized about doctrine in connection with their
analyses of the judicial hierarchy. They have theorized about how higher courts use the
prospect of reversal to discipline lower courts to adhere to the preferences of the higher
courts. Doctrinal language is one way of signaling those preferences to lower courts.
McNollgast have propounded an interesting theory of how the Supreme Court may
enhance lower court compliance through use of a “doctrinal interval” and random
sampling that allows modest departures from its preferences.45 The authors did not
attempt to empirically test the theories, though, and Cross has argued that the prospect of
reversal cannot support a general theory of judicial decision making.46
Social scientific research seems to be evolving in the direction of increased
recognition of the independent significance of legal doctrine.47 While the political
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scientists remain focused on ideology as the driving force behind judicial outcomes, they
increasingly acknowledge that the opinions are not irrelevancies. Their research is
making important strides enabling the quantitative capture of legal doctrine, to more
rigorously test for its meaning. As the research has developed, it appears that law
professors and social scientists are slowly moving together in their understanding of the
law’s operation.
As evident from the above references and those of the first section, the value of
the scientific study of legal doctrine is increasingly recognized. Moreover, there is ample
empirical support for a general claim that doctrinal choices in fact matter in judicial
decision making. To date, this emerging research has proceeded in a rather haphazard
fashion, though, without much of a coordinating theoretical framework. Much of the
research is undertheorized, and the predominant theoretical construct for analyzing the
choice of doctrine has been avoidance of reversal. While this approach is theoretically
sound, the prospect of reversal is sufficiently low that the theory can explain only a
fragment of the doctrinal choices made by courts. The following section presents some
theoretical considerations to guide future research.

III. Theoretical and Empirical Considerations for Analyzing the Role of
Legal Doctrine
Neither the straightforward legal nor political approaches capture the concept of doctrine
and its importance in the working of the law. It should be clear from the research that the
law is both legal and political. Political researchers have too often focused on outcomes
and ignored doctrine. Legal researchers have studied doctrine as pure legal reasoning,
without recognizing its political component. It is this intersection of law and politics that
demands further study. The remainder of this article sets out factors that are important to
this study.
A. Decision Structures: Instruments and Doctrines
Understanding the role of legal doctrine first requires identification of the basic decision
structures involved in judicial decision making and appearing in judicial opinions. These
structures include substantive decision instruments (such as statutory interpretation,
constitutional review, or reasoning process review), procedural decision instruments
(such as standing, ripeness, or statute of limitations review), and legal doctrines that
attach to these decision instruments as guidance in how to apply the instruments in the
given case (the particular doctrinal language). There are often multiple decision
instruments that come into play in a given case. It is typical, for example, in a court’s
review of an administrative agency case to consider both statutory interpretation and
procedural/process instruments.48
There also may be multiple, and sometimes
competing, doctrines for a given instrument (such as the plain meaning rule and the
Chevron doctrine49 for statutory interpretation). The court is left with a set of instrumentdoctrine matches from which to choose in making a decision. Understanding these
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instrument-doctrine options as part of the broader decision making structure of a case is
critical to understanding the work of judges and the strategic opportunities or limitations
they face.
As an example, consider a policy oriented judge who wishes to defeat a plaintiff’s
statutory cause of action. The court can effectively terminate the cause of action by
finding for the defendant either on a procedural issue (e.g., the plaintiff lacks standing to
bring the suit) or on the merits (e.g., the plaintiff’s interpretation of the statute is wrong).
To terminate the case, the judge need only find for the defendant on one of these decision
instruments. The choice about which to use to achieve this outcome, or perhaps to use
both, would be modulated by the available doctrines that attach to each of the
instruments. Suppose that the prevailing doctrine for statutory interpretation in that
jurisdiction was the plain meaning doctrine, and suppose that plain meaning actually
worked in favor of the plaintiff’s interpretation rather than the defendant’s interpretation.
Also suppose that there are competing doctrines (one working for the plaintiff, one
working for the defendant) available on the standing issue such that the court could apply
either doctrine and appear to have engaged in principled decision making. The
sophisticated court would apply the pro-defendant doctrine on the standing issue rather
than defying the doctrinal guidance on the statutory interpretation issue and risk higher
court reversal or loss of public legitimacy.
Sometimes, doctrine will compel a court to reach an outcome other than the one it
desires. At other times, the prevailing legal doctrine may compel a court to choose a
particular instrument in order to reach the outcome it desires, because other instruments
yield the contrary outcome. On yet other occasions, the court might have a choice of
reaching its desired outcome through more than one doctrinal instrument. Thus, while
doctrine can constrain future courts, it can also liberate them to reach desired outcomes.
The issue is complicated further by the fact that the court’s decision itself may create
some sort of doctrine, and it has an incentive to choose the instrument and language that
will be most powerful in influencing future courts. The impact of its decision feeds into
the calculus of the judicial doctrinal choice.
To be sure, there are sub-instruments and sub-doctrines and the boundaries
between them can easily melt away when one deconstructs the nature and role each
structure plays in a given case. And some instruments can even be created by doctrines.50
Indeed the creation of doctrinal instruments is an important topic to study. When courts
create new doctrinal instruments, they are to some degree providing greater discretion to
future courts, by providing additional instrumental options for ideologically preferred
instruments. They might be expected to take such action when the court system is
ideologically aligned with the court creating the doctrinal instrument. An even better
strategy, though, would be to mold the doctrinal instrument in a manner that has a
systematic tendency to favor the preferred side.51 Designing such instruments is not easy
but would be optimal for a court seeking to project its ideology.52
50

See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Manufacturing Ass’n v. State Farm, 436 U.S. 29 (1983).

51

See Eric R. Claeys, The Article II, Section 2 Games: A Game-Theoretic Account of Standing and
Other Justiciability Doctrines, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1321, 1345 (1994) (observing that “procedures can
confer disproportionate advantage to one type of interest over another” and when “one site in a substantive
political debate can use procedure repeatedly to frustrate the other side’s attempts to influence policy to its
political preferences, the procedure has political consequences”).

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art41

Moreover, the fact patterns that must exist to make various decision instruments
available to judges and the role of the plaintiff’s argumentation in presenting the issues
are important factors to consider and pose challenges to any analysis or measurement of
doctrinal use. Nonetheless, attempts to isolate the structures, understand their
interdependence, and measure empirically their impact on decision making, is critical to
the enterprise of understanding legal doctrine and its role in judicial decision making.
B. Models of the Judicial Mind
Another key to understanding the role of legal doctrine is the adoption of a better
model of the judicial mind than has currently been offered. How judges internalize or
utilize legal doctrine in their mental operations is one of the least understood aspects of
judicial decision making, but may be key to understanding the relationship of legal
preferences and policy attitudes. Proponents of the legal and the attitudinal models have
so far offered up black boxes, telling us little more than that judges have preferences
(either for obeying precedent or for certain policies). A more micro-analytic model of the
judicial mind that considers psychological, sociological, and economic aspects is needed.
It may be, for example, that internalization of legal model preferences come from the
socialization of judges through law school training, clerkships, law practice, and
fellowship with other judges. Operating in that mode ensures social-professional
acceptance by, and credibility within, the judge’s community of peers. One would also
ask whether de-socialization occurs at some point, perhaps as judges reach higher levels
within the judicial hierarchy and view themselves more as policy makers than
adjudicators of a specific case.
From an economics of psychology perspective, a judge’s preference for legal
model analysis may be induced by decision cost efficiencies resulting from the decision
heuristics that legal doctrine presents. In such case, doctrines are mentally economical,
allowing for quicker resolution of cases because judges need not rethink the logical
underpinnings of fairness and equity for the given factual situation. Or yet, legal
doctrines may mirror deeper psychological aspects, such as religious or other value
systems already inculcated upon a judge’s mind and, thus, allow a judge to actualize
these psychological preferences in decision contexts that seem tailor made for such use.
A more micro-analytic model of the judicial mind could yield great finds in
analyzing legal doctrine. For example, if the adoption of legal doctrine as a decision
mechanism is related to decision cost efficiencies for the judge, then one might postulate
that higher courts in setting doctrines for lower court obedience (and perhaps political
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control by the higher court) may design doctrines that improve decision cost efficiency as
a way to induce obedience by lower courts. This may mean bright line rules over
standards in certain instances. If courts wish to discourage lower court activism, a
doctrine could be created that, although appearing externally legitimate and principled, in
application is complex and time consuming, thereby discouraging lower court initiative
on the issue. When judges are confronted with alternative high and low cost instruments,
they may choose the lower cost instrument, even if it yields an ideologically contrary
result, because of the time pressures that those judges face.53 This may even create a
natural incentive of the system toward greater reliance on simple rules. If a judge
chooses the “plain meaning” doctrine rather than delving into legislative history, that
judge not only saves his or her own time, the resulting decision also creates doctrine
regarding the proper doctrine for future controversies.
C. Judicial Hierarchies and Political Linguistics
Legal doctrine exists within a decision making hierarchy, where outcomes by
lower courts are subject to review by higher courts. For a lower court, legal doctrine is
utilized to resolve the particular case in front of that court. The institutional role of a
lower court is to look for guidance coming from precedents and statements of doctrine by
the higher court. In reviewing a case on appeal, the higher court’s role is to consider
more broadly the future effects of its decision and doctrinal pronouncements as they carry
direct and indirect implications for the courts beneath it, and indicate a commitment for
the high court’s own future behavior. Even if the doctrine choice produces for the high
court an undesirable outcome in the instant case, it may provide greater policy utility over
the broader set of cases yet to come to the lower courts. In sum, doctrine plays differing
roles for the lower and higher courts and should be modeled as such.54 If the higher court
is more concerned about the implications for many outcomes over a variety of issue
areas, then measuring the particular case outcome of the higher court (that is, coding who
wins or loses the particular case), may not capture the work of the court. The legal
outcome – that is, the choice or endorsement of a particular doctrine -- may, in fact, be
more critical, as the effects of the doctrinal statement for future cases to come will
produce continuing policy impact.
Recognizing the role of hierarchy is also important because it invites an
examination of the political-ideological makeup of each level within the hierarchy,
whether there is political-ideological alignment between the lower and higher levels, and
how legal doctrine reflects these alignments or nonalignments. The design of legal
doctrine (the words, syntax, and structure of the written opinions) may have serious
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implications for the ability of higher courts to control the behavior of lower courts.55
When there is less alignment between the lower and higher courts, doctrinal statements
may be more determinate (looking like rules rather than standards), leaving little
discretion for the lower courts; when there is more alignment, then doctrinal statements
from the higher levels may be less determinate, looking more like standards or balancing
tests that give the lower courts vast discretion. An aligned court system also should mean
providing lower court judges with an expanding set of doctrinal instruments to use, in
their discretion.
D. Political Saliency
The role of doctrine may also vary by the political saliency of the issue area.
Routine issues that lack political saliency would more likely be resolved by a judge’s
strict adherence to legal doctrine. The majority of cases before the courts most likely fit
this profile. Political-ideological preferences would not play the same role as they would
in cases where the issues are high on the political agendas of legislators and the President,
and thus the political agendas of the courts (e.g., war powers, abortion, civil rights, and
federalism issues).
The judges’ psychological interests in applying the law
conventionally would exceed their ideological interests in the case outcome, where
saliency is low. Where political saliency is high, the power of legal doctrine as a guide
for decision making may weaken, and the threat of high court reversal strengthen, as
disciplining devices. Political models of judicial behavior that do no admit to saliency
concerns may be overbroad as general theory and invite empirical inquiries that fail to
test the true power of the models.

IV.

Conclusion

This article called for greater attention to the core elements of legal analysis and how
they relate to a more sophisticated model of judicial behavior. In short, we ask “what is
legal doctrine” – in terms of its power as both a legal and political tool for judicial
decisionmakers. Such an inquiry will require collaborative efforts between legal scholars
who understand the legal meaning and implications of doctrine, and social scientists who
can formalize models of individual and institutional judicial behavior and who also can
quantify and measure characteristics of legal doctrine in the context of such models. The
research dimensions presented here offer some guidance about where to go next.
Undoubtedly, there are many other aspects of legal doctrine impacting judicial behavior
that will need to be addressed as the study progresses. For example, what role does legal
doctrine play with respect to the willingness of potential litigants to bring cases? To what
degree might litigants be able to manipulate doctrinal development through their
selection of cases to bring before the courts? To what extent can the legislature control
legal doctrine with statutory pronouncements? To what extent can judges affect
legislative or administrative agency decisions through doctrine on matters like statutory
interpretation? Do legal scholars play a role in limiting the use of certain legal doctrines
55

Jacobi and Tiller, supra note ***

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

or, perhaps, introducing or endorsing legal doctrines that courts will use? How do we
capture the multiple dimensionality of doctrines -- those doctrines that cut across more
than one issue area, or over multiple instruments, of decision making? Efforts to address
these and related questions will bring controversy, but also a greater number of scholars
with the tools to unpack and evaluate the complex social phenomenon we know as law.
We are optimistic about the enterprise and the likely normative implications from such
research.56
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